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Many explanations of the difﬁculties associated with interpreting
object relative clauses appeal to the demands that object
relatives make on working memory. MacDonald and Christiansen
[MacDonald, M. C., & Christiansen, M. H. (2002). Reassessing work-
ing memory: Comment on Just and Carpenter (1992) and Waters
and Caplan (1996). Psychological Review, 109, 35–54] pointed to
variations in reading experience as a source of differences, arguing
that the unique word order of object relatives makes their process-
ing more difﬁcult and more sensitive to the effects of previous
experience than the processing of subject relatives. This hypothesis
was tested in a large-scale study manipulating reading experiences
of adults over several weeks. The group receiving relative clause
experience increased reading speeds for object relatives more than
for subject relatives, whereas a control experience group did not.
The reading time data were compared to performance of a compu-
tational model given different amounts of experience. The results
support claims for experience-based individual differences and
an important role for statistical learning in sentence comprehen-
sion processes.
 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
George Miller’s (1956) landmark description of the nature of short term memory was a character-
ization of both its limits (7 ± 2 units) and the modulation of these limits through learning, in that thec. All rights reserved.
acDonald).
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being processed. In discussions of computational capacity since that time, different research para-
digms have tended to vary in their attention to the claim of capacity limits vs. the claim that capacity
changes through learning. For example, within adult sentence comprehension, many accounts have
invoked capacity limits to explain people’s difﬁculties in relative clause comprehension (e.g., Gibson,
1998; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Lewis, Vasishth, & VanDyke, 2006). All of these accounts have noted that
experience could affect processing abilities, but the focus in these accounts has been on showing how
a characterization of capacity limits explains certain aspects of sentence comprehension performance,
rather than on investigating how capacity (and presumably performance) could change with learning
over time.
In another sub-ﬁeld of sentence processing, constraint-based accounts of ambiguity resolution
have invoked comprehenders’ detailed knowledge of the language (knowledge of verb biases,
discourse plausibility, etc.) in explaining differences in processing difﬁculty across sentences (see
MacDonald & Seidenberg, 2006, for review), but here too there has been little formal attempt to
address the learning that must underlie the acquisition and use of the probabilistic constraints
hypothesized to shape comprehension performance. This paper begins to address the lack of research
on the role of learning in sentence processing. We take relative clauses as our domain of investigation,
following prior work (MacDonald & Christiansen, 2002) in which we investigated experience-based
changes in relative clause processing in a computational model.
Relative clauses are a good choice for investigating the role of learning in part because these struc-
tures have been central to sentence processing research since Miller and Chomsky (1963) observed
that certain types are very difﬁcult to comprehend. Examples such as (1) are termed subject relatives
because the noun modiﬁed by the relative clause (the head noun), reporter, is the subject of the rela-
tive clause verb attacked. Reordering some of the words in (1) yields example (2); sentences of this
type are termed object relatives because the head noun reporter is the object of the verb attacked.
The contrast between the relatively easy subject relatives and the much more difﬁcult object relatives
has formed the basis for investigations in virtually every area of psycholinguistics, including studies of
memory use in language comprehension (Gibson, 1998; Gordon, Hendrick, & Johnson, 2001; King &
Just, 1991; Lewis et al., 2006), impairment after brain injury (Dickey & Thompson, 2004), comprehen-
sion changes in cognitive aging (Wingﬁeld, Peelle, & Grossman, 2003), typical and atypical child lan-
guage development (Booth, MacWhinney, & Harasaki, 2000; Friedmann & Novogrodsky, 2007; Kidd,
Brandt, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2007), and individual differences in adults Just and Carpenter (1992)
and King and Just (1991).
1. Subject relative clause: The reporter that attacked the senator admitted the error.
2. Object relative clause: The reporter that the senator attacked admitted the error.
Despite this extensive use of relative clause materials in language research, there is remarkably lit-
tle agreement about what makes object relatives harder than subject relatives in English. Some
researchers have suggested that object relatives are harder because the sentence’s meaning is more
complicated in object relatives than in subject relatives, in that the head noun (such as reporter in
the object relative (2)) is simultaneously the object of the relative clause verb attacked and the subject
of the main clause verb admitted, whereas the head noun is the subject of both verbs in subject rela-
tives (Bever, 1970; MacWhinney & Pléh, 1988). Other researchers have pointed to processing difﬁculty
as the sentence unfolds. Gibson and colleagues (Gibson, 1998; Grodner & Gibson, 2005; Warren &
Gibson, 2002) have emphasized the locality of the thematic role assignments and the working memory
burden of maintaining noun phrases in memory before they can be assigned thematic roles and inte-
grated into the sentence. The word order of object relatives requires longer maintenance of unana-
lyzed noun phrases than in subject relatives. Others have suggested that these unintegrated noun
phrases in the object relative clause interfere with each other in working memory (Gordon, Hendrick,
& Johnson, 2004; Gordon et al., 2001; Lewis & Nakayama, 2002; Lewis et al., 2006).
A few accounts have emphasized the role of experience in object relative processing. Gennari and
MacDonald (2008) argued that object relatives are much easier with inanimate head nouns as in (3)
than with animate head nouns as in (2) because the animacy information is relevant to resolving
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2002; Traxler, Morris, & Seely, 2002; Warren & Gibson, 2002). Gennari and MacDonald linked the pro-
cesses of object relative interpretation to constraint-based ambiguity resolution, in which compreh-
enders use information concerning the most likely interpretation to guide the interpretation of
temporary ambiguities in object relative clause structures. On this view, comprehenders are exposed
to the distributional patterns of noun animacy that tend to occur in relative clauses (which are them-
selves shaped by various constraints on the language production system, Gennari & MacDonald, sub-
mitted for publication), they encode these regularities via statistical learning, and they use this
knowledge to guide their interpretation of new input. Similarly, Reali and Christiansen (2007a,
2007b) showed that comprehenders’ knowledge of typical pronoun usage patterns in relative clauses
predicted processing difﬁculty.
3. Object relative, inanimate head: The article that the senator attacked was retracted.
To date, the most explicit description of statistical learning and ambiguity resolution in relative
clauses comes from the claims and computational modeling in MacDonald and Christiansen (2002),
who examined effects of learning about relative clause structures themselves, independent of animacy
or other lexical content. They argued that statistical learning would have different effects on compre-
hension of subject and object relative clauses in English and drew an analogy between sentence com-
prehension processes and the Frequency  Regularity interaction in word recognition (e.g., Seidenberg,
1985). This phenomenon refers to the ambiguity in English spelling patterns, such as the fact that the
letter sequence int sometimes is pronounced /Int/ (as inmint) and at other times is pronounced /aynt/
(as in pint). The effect of this ambiguity on reading speed and accuracy varies with both a word’s fre-
quency in the language and the number of other words that share the same spelling-sound correspon-
dence (its regularity or consistency). Speciﬁcally, reading is faster and more accurate for regular words
(ones with many ‘‘neighbors” with the same spelling-sound relationship, as in hint, mint, lint, dint, etc.)
than for irregular ones like pint. Moreover, this effect of regularity is much larger for low frequency
words than for high frequency words in the language. Regular words receive a beneﬁt from the neigh-
bors, which provide practice on similar spelling-sound relationships, so that computing the pronunci-
ation of the rare regular word dint, for example, is affected not only by experience with dint itself, but
also by experience with similar words hint, mint, sprint, etc. Irregular words such as pint, however,
have few neighbors with similar spelling-sound computations, and thus ease of computing pronunci-
ations for these words is strongly dependent on speciﬁc experience with the words themselves. Thus
very common irregular words, such as have, are read quickly and on par with regular words of similar
frequency, while rare irregular words are read more slowly than regularly spelled words in the same
frequency range.
Several researchers have suggested that sentence ambiguity resolution also has aspects of the fre-
quency  regularity interaction, that certain sentence types are more ‘‘regular” than others, meaning
that there is a more consistent mapping between their surface form (the word order) and their mean-
ing. On this view, sentence processing should also exhibit Frequency  Regularity interactions, such
that interpretation of less regular sentence types (those with idiosyncratic syntax-meaning mappings)
depend heavily on speciﬁc experience (frequency) of that exact structure (Juliano & Tanenhaus, 1993;
Pearlmutter & MacDonald, 1995). MacDonald and Christiansen suggested that object relatives were an
example of irregular sentences, while subject relatives are more regular, in that they adhere closely to
the overwhelmingly frequent S–V–O (subject–verb–object) word order in English. Moreover, the pat-
tern of thematic role assignments also follows the overwhelmingly common English pattern of the
immediately preverbal noun being the agent of the action and the post-verbal noun being the patient.
Readers’ processing of subject relatives thus beneﬁts from their many encounters with sentence
‘‘neighbors”: simple transitive sentences that share the S–V–O word order and thematic role assign-
ments of subject relatives. Object relatives, however, follow an irregular O–S–V word order and pa-
tient-agent order of thematic role assignment that are extremely rare in English. Object relatives
thus have essentially no sentence ‘‘neighbors” in terms of word order and thematic role assignments.
As a result, processing of object relatives beneﬁts almost exclusively from direct experience with
J.B. Wells et al. / Cognitive Psychology 58 (2009) 250–271 253object relatives themselves, which are far lower in frequency than simple transitive sentences in Eng-
lish (Rohde, 2002; Roland, Dick, & Elman, 2007).
MacDonald and Christiansen used the Frequency  Regularity analogy to reinterpret previous re-
search suggesting that working memory capacity limits comprehenders’ interpretation of object rel-
ative clauses. King and Just (1991) and Just and Carpenter (1992) argued that individual differences
in speed and accuracy of comprehending object relative clauses was predicted by performance on
Daneman and Carpenter’s Reading Span task, that those who scored high on this measure could com-
prehend object relatives faster or better than those with poorer reading span scores. Whereas King and
Just (1991) and Just and Carpenter (1992) emphasized capacity limits in this case, arguing that the
working memory capacity of lower span readers was not sufﬁcient to process object relatives sufﬁ-
ciently, MacDonald and Christiansen emphasized modulation of performance through learning. Their
argument was again inspired by results in the word recognition domain. Seidenberg (1985) had sug-
gested that the exact nature of the frequency by regularity interaction might vary across individuals.
He examined readers with different levels of reading skill and argued that highly skilled readers had a
large band of irregular words that could be read as quickly as regular words. By contrast, the less
skilled readers read irregular words more slowly than regular words for all but the highest frequency
irregulars. Seidenberg attributed this effect to differential effects of reading experience on regular vs.
irregular forms—effectively a Frequency  Regularity  Experience interaction. The highly skilled
group, who presumably read more than the low skill group, had more experience with both regular
and irregular words, but this extra experience was much more helpful for the irregular words than
the regular ones.
MacDonald and Christiansen argued that King and Just (1991) relative clause results could also be
an example of a Frequency  Regularity  Experience interaction. They suggested that people who
scored well on the reading span task were those who read more and thus had more experience than
those with lower reading span scores; this extra experience was hypothesized to be both the source of
the high-span group’s good reading span performance and their better comprehension of object rela-
tives. More speciﬁcally, variations in reading experience were hypothesized to change the nature of
people’s Frequency  Regularity interaction for relative clauses. Amount of reading experience was
predicted to have little inﬂuence on subject relative processing, because even inexperienced readers
have encountered the regular S–V–O word order often enough in simple transitive sentences to be
fairly adept at its processing. However, reduced experience should impair the processing of object rel-
atives, because the latter’s irregular O–S–V word order makes processing them highly dependent upon
direct experience with object relatives themselves.
MacDonald and Christiansen tested these hypotheses through computational simulations in which
connectionist networks were provided with differing amounts of experience on corpora generated by
a probabilistic context-free grammar and a small vocabulary. The corpora included simple intransitive
S–V sentences, simple S–V–O transitive sentences, and sentences with subject or object relatives,
some with multiple embeddings. Importantly, subject and object relatives occurred with equal prob-
ability, each accounting for about 2.5% of the sentences in the experience corpora. MacDonald and
Christiansen assessed network performance after different amounts of experience by measuring pro-
cessing accuracy for novel test sentences. They predicted that subject relative processing would be
facilitated by extensive exposure to simple transitive sentences in the corpora, which shared much
of the S–V–O word order of subject relatives, and thus amount of experience would have little effect
on subject relative processing. In contrast, the processing of irregular object relatives was predicted to
be largely dependent on exposure to object relatives themselves, so that there should be a large effect
of experience on object relative processing. These predictions were conﬁrmed, lending support to the
claim that the King and Just (1991) effects of reading span could have arisen from variation in reading
experience.
These modeling results are suggestive, but they do not provide a direct test of the role of experience
on relative clause comprehension. The current study therefore aims to investigate whether manipula-
tions of people’s experience with relative clause constructions will result in the same experience-
based patterns of performance suggested by the model. We designed a study to manipulate readers’
experience with relative clause constructions in four experimental sessions spaced over 3–4 weeks.
Half of the participants were assigned to a Relative Clause experience condition and received reading
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Control experience group, received experience with other complex sentences. All participants were
administered the reading span task twice. The ﬁrst administration was prior to the experience manip-
ulation and was done in part to assure that the Relative Clause and Control experience groups were
matched on reading span, a known correlate of verbal ability (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). The sec-
ond administration followed the experience manipulation and assessed the effect of experience on
reading span scores. Reading performance on sentences involving subject and object relative clauses
was also assessed before and after the experience manipulations, using a self-paced reading task sim-
ilar to that used by King and Just. We predicted that the reading patterns of Relative Clause experience
participants would resemble those of MacDonald and Christiansen’s SRN models—namely, equivalent
exposure to subject and object relatives would facilitate reading times on object far more than on sub-
ject relatives. In other words, we predicted that readers would initially show a strong effect of relative
clause type in reading times, but that the size of this effect would diminish after exposure to an equal
number of object and subject relative sentences—a Testing Session (pre- vs. post-test)  Relative
Clause Type interaction in reading times in critical regions. No such result is expected for the control
experience group, so that across both groups of subjects, we expect an Experience Group  Testing
Session  Relative Clause Type interaction. These results would support claims for the importance
of reading experience—permitting statistical learning about key properties of relative clauses—in adult
relative clause processing.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were 97 undergraduates from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. They received
either monetary compensation or course credit for their participation in four testing sessions. All were
native speakers of English.
2.2. Materials
2.2.1. Reading span task
Because each participant performed the reading span task twice (once in Session 1 and once in Ses-
sion 4), two lists were constructed, each composed of 70 unrelated sentences ranging in length from
11 to 17 words. None of the 70 sentence-ﬁnal words was repeated within a list. Seventy-two of the
sentences were taken from Daneman and Carpenter (1980) reading span task. The remaining 68 sen-
tences were constructed in a narrative style similar to that of the Daneman and Carpenter sentences.
All sentences were ordered randomly and then assigned to two lists, each with 36 Daneman and
Carpenter sentences and 34 new sentences. The assignment of lists to testing session was counterbal-
anced across participants. Each sentence was printed in a single line on an 8.500  5.500 index card. The
cards were arranged in sets of increasing numbers of sentences. The ﬁrst ﬁve sets contained two sen-
tences each, which were followed by sets of three, four, and ﬁve distinct sentences. Blank cards were at
the end of each set to signal the participant’s recall of all sentence-ﬁnal words within that set.
2.2.2. Pre-test and post-test for relative clause reading
For the self-paced reading pre- and post-tests, 40 pairs of subject and object relative sentences
were constructed. All the words in a given subject relative/object relative pair remained the same;
the only difference was the word order, as in ‘‘The clerk that trained the typist told the truth about
the missing ﬁles.” (subject relative version) and ‘‘The clerk that the typist trained told the truth about
the missing ﬁles.” (object relative version). The head noun phrase and object relative clause always
comprised six words and had the form The noun that the noun verbed, while the subject relatives al-
ways had the form The noun that verbed the noun. The main verb (e.g., told) immediately followed
the end of the relative clause, such that it was always the 7th word in the sentence. Material after
the main verb continued plausibly and contained four or more additional words.
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tionships, as the absence of plausibility information increases the difﬁculty of these structures (King &
Just, 1991). For the clerk/typist example above, the assumption was that a clerk is no more likely to
train a typist than a typist to train a clerk, and that a clerk is no more likely than a typist to tell the
truth about missing ﬁles. Eight sentence pairs were adapted from materials in King and Just’s no-bias
condition, and the other 32 were developed anew. None of the nouns or verbs in the experimental
materials was repeated in any other experimental or ﬁller sentence.
Beyond the absence of plausibility information, the lexical properties of the experimental sen-
tences were controlled in several respects. First, both the head noun and the noun in the relative
clause were always animate, typically job descriptions such as clerk and typist. Head nouns are typi-
cally animate for subject relatives but inanimate for object relatives (Gennari & MacDonald, submitted
for publication; Roland et al., 2007). We know of no animacy statistics for the other noun in the rel-
ative clause, but it is likely that the noun tends to be animate in object relatives (where it is the agent
of the action) and inanimate in subject relatives (where it is the patient/theme). Second, no pronouns
were used, though they are common in relative clauses, particularly in object relatives (Reali &
Christiansen, 2007a). Third the relative pronoun was always that, though other choices (e.g., who, or
the omission of the relative pronoun entirely) are also common in natural language (Jaeger, 2005; Race
& MacDonald, 2003; Roland et al., 2007). These lexical choices, while certainly attested in natural lan-
guage relative clauses, are not typically the most common pairings of word choice and structure. How-
ever, they represent the most common instantiations of both subject and object relative clause
materials in many other studies (e.g., some or all conditions in Gennari & MacDonald, 2008, submitted
for publication; Gordon et al., 2001; 2004; King & Just, 1991; Race & MacDonald, 2003; Traxler et al.,
2002; Warren & Gibson, 2002), and thus these choices make the materials most comparable to exist-
ing research.
Eighty ﬁllers without relative clauses were constructed to be generally similar in length and syn-
tactic complexity to the experimental stimuli. Half of the ﬁllers were assigned to the pre-test and half
to the post-test. Each set of 40 ﬁllers included 19 sentences with multiple prepositions (The bush by the
cemetery tower with steep stairs was pruned by the groundskeeper) and 21 sentential complements (The
cooks gossiped that the manager ﬂirted with everyone to amuse herself while working at the diner).
Yes/no comprehension questions were constructed for each experimental and ﬁller sentence. As in
King and Just (1991), half of the comprehension questions for the experimental items interrogated the
main clause, and the other half interrogated the embedded clause. An equal number of questions
interrogating each clause type had ‘‘yes” answers.
Two pre-test scripts were constructed, each containing 10 subject relative sentences, 10 object rel-
ative sentences, and 40 ﬁller sentences. Two post-test scripts were also constructed, with 10 subject
relative sentences, 10 object relative sentences, and 40 ﬁller sentences. A given participant was ex-
posed to one pre-test script in Session 1 and one post-test script in Session 4. The assignment of ﬁller
items to pre- or post-test list was random; all participants saw the same 40 ﬁllers in the pre-test and
40 different ﬁllers in the post-test. Assignment of relative clause sentences to pre- and post-test lists
was counterbalanced so that every participant read exactly one version of each of the 40 subject/ob-
ject relative clause stimulus pairs.
2.2.3. Materials for the experience manipulation
Two sets of stimuli were developed to manipulate participants’ reading experience, one set for the
Relative Clause experience group and one for the Control experience group. The stimuli for the Rela-
tive Clause group consisted of 80 subject relative sentences (e.g., The amateur golfer that had beaten
many of the pros won the celebrated state championship.), 80 object relative sentences (e.g., The actor’s
daughter that the Italian ambassador met last year loved Sicilian food.), and 80 complex ﬁller sentences
without relative clauses. All relative clause sentences were adapted from sentences in the Wall Street
Journal and Brown corpora. They were modiﬁed where necessary to make them comprehensible when
removed from their original contexts, to have animate common noun heads and relative clause nouns,
to have the relative pronoun that, and to replace any nouns or verbs that were contained in the exper-
imental sentences in the pre- and post-tests. Compared to the pre- and post-test stimuli, the subject
and object relative experience sentences were longer and more variable, with many noun and verb
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rience set have the structure of the tightly controlled sequences in subject and object relatives in the
pre- and post-tests (The noun that {verbed the noun/the noun verbed} verbed. . .). Thus if participants in
the Relative Clause experience group learn something about relative clauses from their exposure to
additional sentences, this learning cannot be attributed to expectations about simple noun and verb
adjacencies.
The stimuli for the control experience group consisted of 80 sentential complement sentences (e.g.,
The organizers estimated that more than 100,000 people attended the peace rally last year), 80 conjoined
sentences (e.g., The amateur golfer had beaten many of the pros and even won the celebrated champion-
ship), and the same 80 ﬁllers as seen by the Relative Clause group. The sentential complement sen-
tences were taken from the Wall Street Journal and Brown corpora and were chosen to be roughly
the same length as relative clause stimuli; they were modiﬁed as necessary in the same manner as
for the relative clause sentences. The conjoined experience sentences were adapted from materials
in the Relative Clause experience condition. Eighty of the relative clause experience items were
restructured into conjoined sentences such that each of the 80 conjoined experience sentences was
closely matched on topic to a relative clause experience sentence. For example, the conjoined sen-
tence, The amateur golfer had beaten many of the pros and even won the celebrated championship, was
created from a subject relative experience sentence, The amateur golfer that had beaten many of the pros
won the celebrated state championship. Forty conjoined sentences were derived from subject relative
experience sentences, and 40 were created from object relative experience sentences. Thus the Rela-
tive Clause and control experience materials differed greatly in sentence structure, but there was sub-
stantial overlap in the topics and content words across the two sets of materials.
Across both experience sets, the subject nouns of all sentences (including ﬁllers) were animate,
mostly referring to human occupations or roles. Though there was no overlap of subject nouns and
verbs from experience to pre- and post-test materials, there was some repetition of the subject nouns
and verbs within the experience stimuli. Where there were repetitions, each experience group saw
each noun or verb approximately the same number of times.
To reduce potential effects of practice with the Yes/No question structure of the pre- and post-test
stimuli, a different comprehension probe structure was used for the experience stimuli. After each
experience sentence, two statements appeared, and participants selected which of two statements
was true according to the information in the sentence. Answer options for relative clause sentences
were paired such that one statement concerned the event associated with the main verb of the sen-
tence, and the other concerned the event associated with the embedded verb. The correct statement
addressed the embedded clause half the time and the main clause the other half.
To approximate the generally high difﬁculty for the relative clause comprehension probes, the
probes for sentential complement and conjoined sentences were made as difﬁcult as possible on a
case-by-case basis, without requiring excessive inferencing about the situation described in the sen-
tence. The correct answer option for these stimuli included the ﬁrst critical verb roughly as often as it
included the second one. The comprehension probes for the 80 ﬁller sentences (seen by all partici-
pants) were also designed to be as difﬁcult as possible on a case-by-case basis.
Five scripts were constructed for each experience group, one for each of ﬁve experience blocks to be
presented over the ﬁrst three experimental sessions. For the Relative Clause experience group, each
script included 16 object relative sentences, 16 subject relative sentences, and 16 ﬁllers. For the con-
trol group, each script contained 16 conjoined sentences, 16 sentential complements, and 16 ﬁllers.
2.3. Procedure
2.3.1. Schedule of tasks and sessions
Each participant was tested in four 30- to 60-min sessions, which were spaced four to eight days
apart, scheduled at the participant’s convenience. The spacing of the sessions was designed to assess
non-immediate effects of experience rather than immediate priming from materials in the experience
manipulation to the items in the post-test. Most notably, the ﬁnal post-test assessing effects of expe-
rience was conducted in Session 4, which was always scheduled at least four days after the last expe-
rience blocks in Session 3.
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were assigned to either the Relative Clause or control experience group. Assignment to experience
groups was semi-random, with the only constraint being an attempt to balance the initial reading
span scores in the two experience groups. Following the group assignment, participants completed
one block of experience sentences in their assigned experience condition.
Participants completed two experience blocks each in Sessions 2 and 3, along with some paper-
and-pencil measures from an unrelated experiment. In Session 4, participants completed the self-
paced reading post-test, followed by a second administration of the reading span task. In sum, two
experience groups completed the identical set of tasks and differed only in the set of stimuli to which
they were exposed during the experience blocks in Sessions 1, 2, and 3. In total, the Relative Clause
experience group read 160 relative clause sentences during the experience sessions (half each of sub-
ject and object relatives), while the control group read 160 sentences containing other complex
structures.
2.3.2. Reading span
In the reading span task, conducted in both Session 1 and Session 4, participants were presented
with individual sentences on large index cards to read aloud, followed by a cue to recall the sen-
tence-ﬁnal words of the sentences in the current set. Participants were instructed to begin to read a
sentence aloud as soon as it was placed in front of them, and they were also told that they should
not look to the end of the sentence to get a preview of the to-be-remembered word. Cards were turned
over and set in front of the participant immediately after he or she had ﬁnished reading the previous
sentence, allowing minimal rehearsal time between sentences. The blank card between sets served as
a recall cue to recall the sentence-ﬁnal words.
After practice with two sets of two sentences each, participants completed ﬁve sets of three sen-
tences. They then were presented with four-sentence, ﬁve-sentence, and six-sentence sets until they
failed all ﬁve sets at a given level. Participants were alerted whenever they were moving to sets with
an increased number of sentences, and they were repeatedly encouraged to try hard, in an attempt to
motivate all participants equally.
The highest level at which a participant correctly recalled all the sentence-ﬁnal words of at least
three out of ﬁve sets constituted a participant’s reading span score. Half credit was added for any high-
er level at which the participant correctly recalled two out of ﬁve sets. For example, if a participant
was correct on three out of ﬁve three-sentence sets and two out of ﬁve four-sentence sets, a reading
span of 3.5 was assigned. Only one half-credit point could be earned.
2.3.3. Reading pre- and post-tests
Participants performed the self-paced reading pre-test in Session 1 and the post-test in Session 4.
The procedure was identical in both sessions. Materials were presented on a computer screen using a
word-by-word, self-paced moving window display (Just, Carpenter, &Woolley 1982). At the beginning
of each trial, a series of dashes appeared on the computer screen, each dash representing a nonspace
character in the sentence. When a participant pressed the space bar, the ﬁrst group of dashes was re-
placed by the ﬁrst word of the sentence. Each subsequent keypress caused the next word to appear
and the previous word to return to dashes. When participants pressed the space bar following the sen-
tence-ﬁnal word, a yes/no question about the sentence appeared. Participants pressed keys labeled
‘‘Yes” or ‘‘No” to answer the question and received feedback on accuracy.
At the beginning of the task, participants received instructions that encouraged them to read
quickly while maintaining good comprehension. After the ten practice trials, a script of experimental
trials (10 object relative sentences, 10 subject relative sentences, and 40 ﬁllers) was presented in a dif-
ferent random order for each participant. Assignment of experimental items to pre- or post-test was
counterbalanced across participants.
2.3.4. Experience
Each participant completed one experience block in Session 1, two in Session 2, and two in Session
3. The procedure for each block was identical and was designed to expose participants to certain sen-
tence types without replicating the reading and comprehension probe tasks used in the pre- and post-
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trast to the single-word presentation in pre- and post-tests). After reading the sentence, participants
pressed the space bar, and two statements appeared one above the other. Participants were instructed
to select the statement that was true according to the information in the sentence. Participants
pressed a key labeled ‘‘Top” to select the top statement and a key labeled ‘‘Bottom” to select the bot-
tom statement. Participants received feedback about the accuracy of their answer.
Each experience block began with instructions followed by four practice sentences. A script of 48
trials was then run, with the sentences appearing in a different random order for each participant.
3. Results
For the following analyses, four participants (all in the Relative Clause experience group) were ex-
cluded due to experimenter or equipment error in some task, and ten (six Control experience and four
Relative Clause experience) were excluded because they failed to return for all four experimental ses-
sions. We also excluded those participants whose mean comprehension accuracy across experimental
items and ﬁllers was 75% or below on either the pre- or the post-test, removing data for 19 partici-
pants (9 in the control experience group and 10 in the Relative Clause experience group). These rates
are somewhat higher than comprehension exclusion rates in other studies of complex sentences. This
higher rate may be attributable in part to our efforts to avoid any plausibility information in the pre-
and post-test relative clauses, which substantially increased comprehension difﬁculty (as in King &
Just, 1991). A second source of participant loss reﬂects the difﬁculty of maintaining participants’ inter-
est and cooperation over four experiment sessions. While many participants completed all tasks as in-
structed, a subset of them expressed annoyance in Session 4 upon being presented with the longer
single-word self-paced reading task in the post-test after several short sessions with whole-sentence
reading tasks, and a few of these participants rushed through the post-test sentences without reading
carefully and answered ‘‘yes” to every comprehension question without regard to actual sentence con-
tent. By retaining only those participants who had comprehension accuracy above 75% on both pre-
and post-tests, we were able to focus on participants who appeared to have conscientiously performed
all tasks in this lengthy study.
Following these exclusions, there were 32 control experience and 32 Relative Clause experience
participants remaining. The two groups were well-matched on reading span and other measures, as
shown in Table 1. Included in this table is information about some participants’ ACT scores. The
ACT is a standardized test taken by some college-bound high school seniors instead of or in addition
to the SAT. Participants gave permission to access their student records, and ACT scores were available
for 46 of the participants; these data also suggest that the groups were well matched.
3.1. Self-paced reading times
All analyses of reading times for the pre- and post-tests included only those trials on which the
comprehension question was answered correctly. Before analysis, RTs that were greater than
2000 ms were removed (0.05% of the data) and the raw reading times were transformed intoTable 1













13:19 28.4 (2.8) 3.30 (0.83) 391 (103.2) 83 (0.13)
Control 11:21 28.2 (2.8) 3.26 (0.86) 390 (101.2) 82 (0.14)
* The ACT is a standardized test, comparable to the SAT, often taken by college-bound high school students. The ACT is scored
on a 36-point scale, and the n for this measure was smaller (n = 46) because not all participants had ACT scores on ﬁle with UW-
Madison.
** Includes experimental and ﬁller stimuli.
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particular participant’s reading time for each word length (Ferreira & Clifton, 1986; Trueswell, Tanen-
haus, & Garnsey, 1994). We calculated each participant’s regression over all sentences except practice
items across both pre-test and post-test, so that the length-adjusted times reﬂect changes in reading
speed from pre-test to post-test. All length-adjusted reading times that were more than 2.5 SD from
the mean reading time at each session, word position and sentence type were replaced with the cutoff
value, affecting 2.6% of the data.
Participants’ length-adjusted reading times on relative clause sentences at the pre- and post-tests
are shown in Fig. 1, and unadjusted times are presented in Appendix A. The data were grouped into
regions in the ﬁgures and in analyses using the same regions that King and Just (1991) and MacDonald
and Christiansen (2002) had previously used. The ﬁrst region contained four words: the head noun,
the relative pronoun that, and the next two words of the relative clause. In the subject relative condi-
tion, this region therefore ended with a determiner, as in senator that attacked the, whereas in the ob-
ject relative condition, the region ended with the embedded subject noun, as in senator that the
reporter. Region 2 contained one word, the embedded object noun in the subject relative condition
and the embedded verb in the object relative condition. The third and fourth regions were identical
for both sentence types. Region 3 contained the main verb, and Region 4 contained the next two words
of the sentence.
Examination of the ﬁgure shows large effects of Session, in that all participants read more quickly
on the post-test (solid lines) than on the pre-test (dashed lines). There was also a main effect of Ses-
sion for the ﬁller sentences (not shown in the ﬁgure); length-adjusted reading times for ﬁllers were a
reliable 71 ms per word shorter on the post-test compared to the pre-test (ps < .001). This pattern is
expected from participants’ increased familiarity with the equipment and task.
The omnibus ANOVA for the Experience Group  Session  Relative Clause Type  Region interac-
tion was reliable (F1(3,186) = 3.33, p < .05, F2(3,117) = 4.73, p < .01), indicating that the different types
of experience did affect reading times in different ways. An examination of the effects at each region of
the sentence revealed the predicted three-way interaction of Experience Group  Session  Relative
Clause Type at Region 3, the main verb (F1(1,62) = 4.22, p < .05; F2(1,39) = 3.93, p = .05) but not at
the other regions, Fs < 1. The effect at the main verb was as follows. In the pre-test, both groups
showed reliably longer reading times for Object Relatives than Subject Relatives at the main verb
(ps < .001). The difference was numerically larger (68 ms) for the Relative Clause experience group
than for the Control group (34 ms), but the interaction of Group and Sentence type was not reliableFig. 1. Length-adjusted self-paced reading times for subject and object relative clauses in the Relative Clause Experience and
Control Experience Groups.
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Relative Clause experience group beneﬁted from their experience, while the control experience group
did not: the control experience group had little change in the difference in reading time between ob-
ject and subject relatives in the pre-test (34 ms) and the post-test (49 ms, a numerical increase), yield-
ing no interaction between Session and Relative Clause Type, Fs < 1. As with the pre-test, the effect of
Relative Clause type was reliable for this group in the post-test, F1(1,31) = 24.62, p < .001;
F2(1,39) = 20.64, p < .001. By contrast, the effect of relative clause type in the Relative Clause experi-
ence group was 68 ms on the pre-test but 21 ms in the post-test, yielding a reliable Session  Relative
Clause Type interaction, F1(1,62) = 4.00, p = .05; F2(1,39) = 4.92, p < .05. The 21 ms effect for the Rela-
tive Clause experience group at the main verb was not a reliable difference (F1(1,31) = 2.56, p > .1;
F2(1,39) = 3.05, p > .08), but we are not claiming that the Relative Clause experience completely re-
moved the difference in difﬁculty between the relative clause types. Our prediction was that Relative
Clause experience would reduce the difﬁculty of object relatives compared with subject relatives, and
these analyses show that this prediction is supported at the main verb.
An important issue for interpreting effects of experience is how well-matched the two groups were
at the pre-test. Examination of the dashed lines in Fig. 1 shows some variation in the patterns of pre-
test reading times in the two groups. Across the sentence as a whole, the two groups were extremely
well matched. There was a main effect of Relative Clause type in pre-test reading times (a 24 ms per
word difference), F1(1,62) = 18.80, p < .001; F2(1,39) = 41.00, p < .001, and no interaction with Experi-
ence group, Fs < 1. However, there was a small interaction between Relative Clause type, Experience
Group, and Sentence Region, which was reliable only in the items analysis, F1(3,186) = 1.55, p > .20;
F2(3,117) = 2.87, p < .05. This result suggests that the reading time contrast in the pre-test between
subject and object relatives is distributed somewhat differently across the two experience groups. Be-
cause of this variation, because there is some concern about comparing word positions with different
word types in subject and object relative clauses (e.g., Region 2 contains a noun in subject relatives
and a verb in object relatives), and because different words in one region may create different spillover
effects to a subsequent region such as Region 3 (the main verb in both conditions) (Mitchell, 1984;
Vasishth & Lewis, 2006), we also examined the effect of experience averaged across Regions 2–4.
These positions are natural ones to investigate because the main verb (Region 3) and the words just
preceding and following it are the typical sites of reading time differences in subject and object rela-
tives (e.g., in results reported by Gordon et al., 2001; King & Just, 1991; Traxler et al., 2002).
The three-way interaction of Experience Group  Relative Clause Type  Session was not reliable in
the mean of Regions 2–4, F1(1,62) = 1.63, n.s.; F2 < 1. This result is not surprising, as this portion of the
sentence contains two regions where the interaction was absent (Regions 2 and 4) one where it was
present (Region 3). Given our hypotheses of a particular pattern of changes from pre-test to post-test,
we pursued additional analyses as planned comparisons. First, in the pre-test, the effect of Relative
Clause Type was robust (ps < .001) and similar in the two groups, i.e., there was no Relative Clause
Type  Experience Group interaction, Fs < 1. The Control Experience group had a 30-ms per word dif-
ference in the pre-test in regions 2–4 and a 25 ms per word difference in the post-test, yielding no
interaction, F1 < 1; F2(1,39) = 2.86, p > .10. By contrast, the Relative Clause Experience group’s reading
times yielded a reliable interaction of Relative Clause type and Session; they had a 41-ms per word
difference between subject and object relatives in the pre-test, reducing to a 15-ms per word differ-
ence in the post-test, F1(1, 31) = 4.11, p = .05; F2(1,39) = 6.91, p < .05. This remaining difference at
post-test between subject and object relatives was reliable (marginal in the items analysis),
F1(1,31) = 6.98, p = .05; F2(1,39) = 3.33, p < .08. Again, our claim is not that the relative clause experi-
ence in this study would remove all subject–object relative differences but rather that it would reduce
those differences. These analyses show that this claim is supported when considering a larger region
than the main verb.
3.2. Accuracy
Participants’ accuracy rates on comprehension questions for the subject relatives, object relatives,
and ﬁller sentences in the pre- and post-test are shown in Table 2. For the experimental items, both
groups had similar accuracy rates across the pre- and post-tests. The interaction of Experience
Table 2
Mean proportion correct and (standard deviations) on pre- and post-test comprehension questions
Experience group Pre-test Post-test
Subject relatives Object relatives Fillers Subject relatives Object relatives Fillers
Relative clause .84 (0.11) .73 (0.16) .89 (0.05) .82 (0.12) .76 (0.15) .93 (0.05)
Control .83 (0.14) .73 (0.16) .89 (0.05) .79 (0.16) .78 (0.16) .92 (0.06)
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tive Clause Type (F1(1,62) = 19.91, p < .001; F2(1,39) = 8.89, p < .01), such that participants had better
comprehension accuracy on subject than object relatives across Session and Experience group. Thus
participants’ overall shorter reading times on the post-test, and in particular the Relative Clause expe-
rience group’s improved reading times on object relatives, did not result in lower accuracy on these
items.
Accuracy rates did show an interaction of Session and Relative Clause Type, such that participants
improved in their accuracy on object relative questions and got slightly worse on subject relative
questions from pre-test to post-test, (F1(1,62) = 6.02, p < .05; F2(1,39) = 7.72, p < .01), This effect did
not interact with Experience Group (Fs < 1.2, ps > .20), and it is not clear why this result obtained.
The two groups improved by 3–4 percentage points in answering comprehension questions for the
ﬁllers from the pre-test to the post-test. This difference resulted in a main effect of Session for the ﬁller
items that was reliable in only the subjects analysis (F1(1,62) = 19.7, p < .001; F2 < 1). Note that ﬁller
items were randomly assigned to either the pre-test or post-test, and this assignment was not coun-
terbalanced. Thus Session was a between-items factor in the ﬁller analyses, and these slight differ-
ences in performance could result from overall improvements with practice and/or slight
differences in the difﬁculty in the questions of the ﬁllers assigned to the two tests. There was no Ses-
sion  Experience Group interaction for the ﬁllers (Fs < 1), suggesting that the two types of experience
did not differentially affect performance on the ﬁller sentences.
3.3. Reading span
In Session 1, the mean reading span scores of the Relative Clause experience group (span of 3.30,
SD = .83) and the Control group (3.26, SD = .86) did not differ. This outcome is expected because par-
ticipants were assigned to Relative Clause and Control groups in a way that balanced the span scores
in each group. Participants’ Session 1 span scores correlated reliably with their scores on the second
reading span test, administered in Session 4, r = .46, F(1,62) = 16.64, p < .0001. This fairly modest test–
retest relationship is consistent with ﬁndings in previous studies; MacDonald, Almor, Henderson,
Kempler, and Andersen (2001) reported a correlation of .54 between two Reading Span administra-
tions about two weeks apart, and Waters and Caplan (1996) reported a correlation of .41 between
two administrations separated by a somewhat longer interval. The general trend in the current study
was for participants to improve their score from the ﬁrst test (3.28, SD = .85) to the second test (3.58,
SD = .96), F(1,62) = 7.36, p < .01. This effect was somewhat larger in the Relative Clause experience
group (Session 4 span 3.79, SD = .98) than in the Control group (Session 4 span 3.38, SD = .91), resulting
in a marginal interaction of Experience group and Session, F(1,62) = 3.13, p < .09. Given the relatively
modest test–retest reliability of the task, it is unclear how to interpret these small differences in
improvement in the two groups.
4. Discussion
The reading time results show a strong effect of experience in processing relative clauses. Impor-
tantly, the effect was asymmetrical, in that equal amounts of experience with subject and object rel-
atives had a greater effect on the object relatives than on the subject relatives, reducing differences
in reading times between the two conditions from pre-test to post-test. This pattern is consistent
with the experience-based predictions in our account and is notable for its generality in several re-
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reading only 160 relative clauses mixed with ﬁllers of varying sentence constructions. Second, the
effects obtained despite several days’ interval between the last exposure to relative clauses or con-
trol sentences in the experience manipulation and the post-test. This result means that the effects
cannot be attributed to short term priming of a syntactic structure or of any other linguistic ele-
ment. Third, there was no overlap in either nouns or verbs from the experience sentences to the
pre- and post-tests, so the effects cannot be attributed to lexical priming effects of content words.
Fourth, the relative clause sentences in the experience manipulation were longer and more varied
than the pre- and post-test items and never contained the exact word order of the relative clauses
in the tests. Thus the effects cannot be attributed to learning how to handle the strict word se-
quence (The noun that the noun verbed verbed. . .) of the pre- and post-test object relatives. Fifth,
the effects obtained despite the fact that in the experience manipulation, both the reading task
(whole sentence reading) and the comprehension check (selecting a correct statement from two
alternatives) differed from the reading and comprehension tasks in the pre- and post-tests. Thus
the beneﬁt for object relatives in the post-test cannot be attributed to learning strategies related
to the self-paced reading task. Finally, these effects of experience obtained despite the fact that par-
ticipants were never given an explicit task of learning anything; they were simply told to read sen-
tences and respond to comprehension probes.
These results therefore appear to reﬂect powerful implicit learning of properties of the object rel-
atives that are not driven by speciﬁc words or adjacent sequences of word types. To this point we have
not discussed exactly what is learned as a function of reading these sentences, a topic to which we turn
in the general discussion. First, we consider the implications for one of the issues that motivated the
study, the Frequency x Regularity interaction in sentence processing and MacDonald and Christiansen
(2002) computational simulations that yielded greater improvements on object relative clauses than
on subject relatives in the face of equal training on both.
4.1. Relative clause experience and the Frequency x Regularity interaction
In their computational simulations, MacDonald and Christiansen (2002) investigated whether a
Frequency Regularity interaction in relative clause processing would emerge as a consequence of
experience. They trained simple recurrent networks (SRNs; Elman, 1990) on corpora primarily consist-
ing of simple sentences but which also included equal amounts of subject and object relative clauses.
SRNs incorporate recurrent connections that allow past internal states to affect future processing, thus
enabling these networks to process hierarchically organized sequential material such as natural lan-
guage sentences. Prior work has indicated that such networks can learn to process subject and object
relatives (Christiansen & Chater, 1999; Elman, 1991; Weckerly & Elman, 1992), and MacDonald and
Christiansen predicted that differences in exposure would affect objective relatives more than subject
relatives—even if exposure to the two types of relative clauses was equated.
The SRNs were trained on corpora generated by a probabilistic context-free grammar covering the
minimal fragment of English grammar needed for exploring the Frequency  Regularity interaction in
relative clause processing. This grammar fragment included subject noun–verb agreement, two verb
tenses, variations in verb argument structure, and multiple relative clause embeddings with complex
agreement structure. Sentences were generated using a very small 30-word vocabulary, including one
determiner (e.g., the, though words were coded with single units and thus had no real semantics), one
complementizer (that), singular and plural nouns (e.g., lawyer, lawyers), and present and past tense
verbs that were obligatorily transitive (e.g., praises, praise, praised), obligatorily intransitive (e.g., hes-
itates, hesitate, hesitated) or used in both transitive and intransitive contexts (e.g., phones, phone,
phoned). Sentences with present tense verbs employed number agreement between the subject noun
and the verb (e.g., The lawyers hesitate. The senator phones the reporter.) Each training corpus consisted
of 10,000 sentences of which 95% were simple intransitive or transitive sentences. The remaining 5% of
the sentences were divided equally between the two relative clauses types—250 subject relatives and
250 object relatives—randomly interleaved with the simple sentences. The length of the sentences
ranged from 3 to 27 words, with a mean length of 4.5 words reﬂecting the preponderance of simple
intransitive (3 words) and transitive (5 words) sentences.
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on different randomly selected sets of 10,000 sentences generated by the probabilistic grammar. This
roughly reﬂects the fact that language learners start out with different initial conditions and are ex-
posed to different subsets of language. The networks were trained to predict upcoming input through
the sentence and were provided with three epochs of training, corresponding to three increasing levels
of experience with their respective training corpus. A separate test corpus was constructed involving
10 subject relatives (as in (1)) and 10 object relatives (as in (2)). These test sentences were all novel
and thus had not been processed by any of the 10 networks prior to testing. Even though the grammar
and the vocabulary used in these simulations were both very small, together they can nonetheless
generate a large number of sentences with embedded relative clauses such as (1) and (2). The total
number of possible sentences of the form used to test the networks—detN comp [detNVtrans]/[Vtrans-
detN]Vtrans detN—is 128,000, of which each network at most would have seen 0.4%. Thus, the SRNs
were tested on completely novel sentences in which the words and their general distributional usage
were familiar, similar in many ways to the situation facing the human participants in our training
study.
The networks’ prediction performance on the test sentences were assessed using the Grammatical
Prediction Error (GPE) metric, as described in Appendix A of MacDonald and Christiansen (2002). GPE
provides a conservative measure of how well the networks are able predict all and only the grammat-
ical continuations at any given point in a sentence. The GPE for an individual word reﬂects the difﬁ-
culty that the SRN experienced for that word given the previous sentential context and can be mapped
qualitatively onto word reading times, with low GPE values reﬂecting a prediction for short reading
times and high values indicating long predicted reading times.
In Fig. 2, we have replotted the GPE scores averaged across the 10 SRNs from MacDonald and
Christiansen (2002) original simulations. The pattern of GPE scores across the three epochs indicate
that the SRNs found object relatives harder to process than subject relatives, that increased experience
facilitated processing, and that object relatives beneﬁted more from increased experience than did
subject relatives. MacDonald and Christiansen did not test the statistical signiﬁcance of their SRN re-
sults, so we conducted a two-way ANOVA on the original main verb GPE scores. As suggested by Fig. 2,
there was a main effect of Experience, F(2,18) = 7.12, p < .005, with decreasing GPE scores across
epochs, and a main effect of Relative Clause Type, F(1,9) = 8.25, p < .02, with subject relatives eliciting
lower GPE scores than object relatives. The Experience  Relative Clause Type interaction was only
marginally signiﬁcant, F(2,18) = 3.10, p = .07, but this is most likely due to a lack of power. Indeed,
when we ran an additional 10 SRNs with new random starting weights and different 10,000-word cor-Fig. 2. Comparison of mean Grammatical Prediction Error (GPE) for the 10 models described in MacDonald and Christiansen
(2002) and reading times for the Relative Clause Experience Group.
264 J.B. Wells et al. / Cognitive Psychology 58 (2009) 250–271pora (with all other parameters being the same as in MacDonald & Christiansen, 2002), the results
with N = 20 followed the same pattern and yielded a reliable interaction, F(2,38) = 3.57, p < .04.
The pattern of SRN results parallels the reliable Session  Relative Clause Type interaction found
for our Relative Clause experience group. Fig. 2 further illustrates this parallel by including the pre-
and post-test human data from the Relative Clause experience group (there is no equivalent to the
Control experience group in the simulations). The Relative Clause experience data in Fig. 2 is nor-
malized to remove the overall drop in reading times from pre- to post-test that was evident in
Fig. 1. Much of this decrease in reading times across sessions is due to a growing familiarity with
the computerized self-paced reading task; the control group also showed this overall decrease in
times, and the effect also obtained for ﬁller items. Because there is no mechanism whereby the
SRN can capture reading changes owing to increased familiarity with the experimental apparatus,
we recalculated each Relative Clause experience participant’s length-adjusted reading times, per-
forming the calculation for the pre-test and post-test data separately. The resultant data set reﬂects
deviations from length-based predictions for each participant given their reading speed in each ses-
sion. Fig. 2 thus shows these recalculated reading times for the Relative Clause experience group,
indicating that there is a close parallel between the patterns of human and SRN performance as a
function of experience and relative clause type. In other words, the humans’ extra experience with
relative clauses, reﬂected in reading times, closely resembles the SRNs’ extra relative clause experi-
ence, reﬂected in GPE scores.
Of course, there are many important differences between the training experience provided to the
SRNs in MacDonald and Christiansen (2002) and the kind of training experience that human partic-
ipants received. For example, there were no semantic representations in the SRN simulations,
whereas the human participants read sentences for meaning so as to be able to select the correct
of two comprehension probes. Nonetheless, the original simulations do capture two important as-
pects of our experimental manipulations. First, there are the within-sentence differences; as is clear
from Fig. 2, the GPE values from the SRNs provide a good ﬁt to reading patterns through the sen-
tence, and a good contrast between subject and object relatives. That is, the networks generally
had higher error values (reﬂecting more uncertainty in the network) in those sentence regions
where human readers had longer reading times. This reﬂects the SRN’s ability to capture reading
patterns throughout the sentence within subject and object relative clause sentences, and it is con-
sistent with other SRN models of relative clause processing (e.g., Christiansen & Chater, 1999; El-
man, 1991; Weckerly & Elman, 1992). Second, there are the experience-based differences; the
SRNs show greater improvement on object relatives compared with subject relatives as training in-
creases, consistent with the human data. In this context, it is important to note that the networks’
training experiences indirectly capture some of the relevant lexical properties of the human Relative
Clause experience materials. In particular, the human Relative Clause materials all involved animate
common nouns both as head nouns and in the relative clauses. Because the networks would have
come across every noun as the subject of a sentence, the nouns can therefore been seen as corre-
sponding distributionally to animate nouns (though there were no explicit semantics associated
with this; see Weckerly & Elman, 1992, for a similar distributional approach to animacy). This factor
(along with the lack of distributionally inanimate nouns) is likely to have played a role in paralleling
the human Relative Clause experience data. The SRNs’ ability to show both within-sentence and
experience-based effects that are similar to those of human readers is a clearly positive aspect of
MacDonald and Christiansen’s original modeling effort.
From a modeling perspective, the close match between the SRN predictions and the human read-
ing time data from the Relative Clause experience condition is striking given the relative simplicity
of the original simulations. MacDonald and Christiansen introduced the SRN simulations as a dem-
onstration of the differential impact of experience on the processing of subject and object relative
clauses. The models were trained on a small fragment of language and not meant to capture general
aspects of sentence processing or even all aspects of relative clause processing. In particular, the ab-
sence of semantics in the model architecture means that semantic and discourse factors identiﬁed as
important to relative clause processing, such as discourse load (Warren & Gibson, 2002), and agent-
patient similarity (Gordon, Hendrick, & Johnson, 2004; Gordon et al., 2001), in principle cannot be
captured by MacDonald and Christiansen’s SRNs. Nonetheless, the networks were able to capture
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well as the effect of experience. This result provides strong support for the importance of word order
in the differences in difﬁculty in two relative clause types (a major feature of MacDonald and Chris-
tiansen’s simulations), which has received less attention in recent years as researchers have begun
more ﬁne-grained analyses of subject- and object relative discourse and lexical properties. The re-
sults also support MacDonald and Christiansen’s use of the SRN model to capture the role of expe-
rience on relative clause processing, and, more generally, the hypothesized role of
Frequency  Regularity interaction in explaining the speciﬁc human reading time patterns at the
sentence level.5. General discussion
This work has investigated the role of experience, or learning, in interpreting complex relative
clauses. More speciﬁcally, we have tested the claim that the effect of a given amount of sentence
comprehension experience will vary with the nature of the sentences that are being comprehended
and their relationship to previously experienced sentences. We hypothesized that subject relative
structures, which share basic word order similarities with common simple transitive sentences,
would receive less beneﬁt from additional experience than would object relative sentences, which
are quite idiosyncratic in their structure. This is the essential claim of a Frequency  Regularity
interaction: that the effect of frequency of a linguistic element, such as a sentence type, varies as
a function of the relationship of that element to other elements in the language. The results of
the present study, together with the simulations, suggest that experience is a powerful factor in sen-
tence comprehension expertise, even among young adult college students. These ﬁndings have
implications for several different areas of learning, individual differences, and language
comprehension.
5.1. Experience and sentence comprehension
The present empirical results and their close relationship to the SRNs argue for a powerful role
for experience in language comprehension. This work ﬁts within a long tradition of research empha-
sizing the importance of practice in gaining skill, including in memory tasks (e.g., Chase & Ericsson,
1982; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Langley & Simon, 1981, chap. 12). Language comprehension is not
generally described as a skill requiring practice, in contrast to more specialized abilities such as
chess and playing a musical instrument. Indeed, extensive discussion in cognitive science of innate
endowments for language in humans often seems to discourage the notion that practice is an impor-
tant component, beyond the need to learn the unique aspects of the input language. However, what-
ever the innate components turn out to be, they are not mutually exclusive with an important role
for practice, and abundant evidence attests to this view. For example, there is extreme variation in
the amount of language input provided by caregivers to their infants, and there is a strong correla-
tion between amount of input and speed of word learning in young children, even when controlling
for other factors such as socio-economic status (Hart & Risley, 1995; Huttenlocher, Vasilyeva, Cym-
erman, & Levine, 2002).
Findings for a critical role of experience in sentence processing does not deny that innate individual
differences may exist. Rather, it represents a shift in the weight that is given to alternative explana-
tions for individual differences—a shift away from an explanation that invokes the size of a ﬁxed
capacity and a stronger emphasis on the amount that an individual has learned from past experiences.
Gupta (2003) makes similar arguments for experience–learning–memory relationships at the lexical
level, and it is likely that other domains are similarly ripe for an exploration of the role of prior learn-
ing in memory and other cognitive performance. We next pursue this role for prior learning with a
discussion of statistical learning and its role in individual differences, relative clause interpretation,
and sentence comprehension more generally.
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Over the past decade, statistical learning—the discovery of structure by way of statistical properties
of the input—has emerged a general candidate mechanism by which a broad range of linguistic expe-
rience can be acquired (for reviews, see Gómez & Gerken, 2000; Saffran, 2003). This type of implicit
learning has been demonstrated across a variety of natural and artiﬁcial language learning situations,
including learning of information that is potentially highly relevant to sentence comprehension pro-
cesses, such as discovering phonological and distributional cues to lexical categories (Monaghan,
Chater, & Christiansen, 2005), acquiring gender-like morphological systems (Brooks, Braine, & Cata-
lano, 1993; Frigo & McDonald, 1998), locating syntactic phrase boundaries (Saffran, 2001, 2003), using
function words to delineate phrases (Green, 1979), integrating prosodic and morphological cues in the
learning of phrase structure (Morgan, Meier, & Newport, 1987), and detecting long-distance relation-
ships between words (Gómez, 2002; Onnis, Christiansen, Chater, & Gómez, 2003). Of particular rele-
vance is an individual differences study by Misyak and Christiansen (2007) who found that statistical
learning ability was a stronger predictor of relative clause comprehension than the reading span mea-
sure. Together, these studies suggest that statistical learning may play a strong role in the accumula-
tion of linguistic experience relevant for sentence processing.
Moreover, within natural language comprehension and production studies, there is clear evidence
that prior experience with sentences of a given syntactic structure affects both subsequent compre-
hension of similar structures and the probability that a speaker will utter a sentence with the same
or similar structure, even when there is no meaning overlap between sentences (see Ferreira & Bock,
2006, for review). These effects, often termed structural persistence or syntactic priming, have been de-
scribed as stemming from statistical learning at the syntactic level (Bock & Grifﬁn, 2000; Chang, Dell, &
Bock, 2006) or at the syntactic–semantic interface (Chang, Bock, & Goldberg, 2003; Hare & Goldberg,
1999). The experience effects from the present study can be viewed as examples of statistical learning
of information relevant to sentence processing. The current results, in which effects of experience
were observed over several days, extend previous ﬁndings of structural persistence effects, which
have typically been assessed within a single testing session. To date, structural persistence effects
in comprehension studies have typically been relatively weak, often requiring the repetition of a verb
between prime and target sentences in order to observe a reliable effect on target sentence reading
time (Arai, Van Gompel, & Scheepers, 2007). The present results suggest that given a multi-day pre-
sentation of ‘‘primes” (that is, the experience manipulation), robust effects can be observed on ‘‘target”
items (sentences in the post-test) without any content word overlap between prime and target. Long-
lasting, robust effects such as these are to be expected if statistical learning mechanisms are truly
underlying important aspects of language acquisition and use.
5.3. Statistical learning and relative clause processing
Previous work has suggested that object relative clauses contain ambiguities in interpretation that
are not present in subject relatives (Gennari & MacDonald, 2008), and that object relative comprehen-
sion difﬁculty correlates with the distributional patterns in corpora, such that higher frequency pat-
terns are associated with more rapid processing (Gennari & MacDonald, submitted for publication;
Reali & Christiansen, 2007a). Our work here directly manipulated relative clause frequencies and
showed that these manipulations yielded more improvement with object than subject relatives (the
Frequency Regularity interaction). We suggest that additional experience with object relatives is
particularly useful in helping comprehenders navigate the ambiguities inherent in this structure,
which in turn raises the question of exactly what it is that the Relative Clause experience group
learned about relative clauses from the experience manipulation.
As shown by corpus analyses, object relative clauses contain a complex web of lexical, structural
and discourse-related distributional information (Gennari & MacDonald, submitted for publication;
Jaeger & Wasow, 2005; Race & MacDonald, 2003; Reali & Christiansen, 2007a, 2007b; Roland et al.,
2007). The present study was not designed to manipulate any particular subset of those constraints,
and so deﬁnitive answers are not possible concerning exactly what the Relative Clause group learned.
Several plausible hypotheses are available, however. One obvious possibility is that the Relative Clause
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word order that is inherent in object relatives but is rare in the rest of the English language, in which
a preverbal noun is the object of the embedded clause verb. Another source of learning that probably
modulated object relative reading times concerns the pairing of noun types and syntactic structures.
All of the relative clauses in the present study (and in most other psycholinguistic studies of relative
clauses) had animate common nouns as the head of the relative clause and the noun within the rel-
ative clause, such as in reporter and senator in (1–2). In the language as a whole, however, object rel-
atives more typically contain inanimate head nouns (Gennari & MacDonald, submitted for
publication; Roland et al., 2007) and pronouns rather than common nouns as the embedded subject
(Race & MacDonald, 2003; Reali & Christiansen, 2007a). Studies have shown that both of these noun
properties affect relative clause processing (Gennari & MacDonald, 2008; Gordon et al., 2001, 2004;
Mak et al., 2002; Race & MacDonald, 2003; Traxler et al., 2002; Warren & Gibson, 2002). The Relative
Clause experience condition may have changed Relative Clause participants’ knowledge about distri-
butional patterns of noun type and relative clause type co-occurrences. Thus whereas the model’s per-
formance, following exposure to a relatively simple grammar and limited vocabulary, can be traced to
learning about word order, the human case affords the opportunity to learn at other ‘‘grains” of sta-
tistics as well. We see this learning, both about word orders and about lexical–structural pairings,
as changing what comprehenders implicitly know about the distribution of object relatives, conse-
quently affecting constraint-based ambiguity resolution processes and reading patterns, as readers ap-
ply these updated probabilistic constraints to new text.
5.4. Linking statistical learning and constraint-based comprehension
Beyond implications for relative clause processing, the results of this experiment and simulation
have implications for studies of constraint-based ambiguity resolution. In the constraint-based ap-
proach, language comprehension is accomplished through the rapid weighing of many probabilistic
constraints concerning the likely interpretation of a sentence, given information about real-world
plausibility, frequency, and other factors (see MacDonald & Seidenberg, 2006, for review). Con-
straint-based sentence processing research has primarily emphasized the time course of use of various
kinds of constraints during on-line comprehension. Far less attention has been directed toward
explaining how the comprehender becomes equipped with information about the constraints. Our re-
sults shed light on this process by showing that comprehenders rapidly learn from comprehension
experience and apply it to subsequent linguistic input.
This approach to learning of probabilistic constraints has implications for studies of individual dif-
ferences. For example, Pearlmutter and MacDonald (1995) investigated individual differences in use of
probabilistic constraints in syntactic ambiguity resolution. They found that readers who scored high
on the reading span task displayed reading patterns that reﬂected the application of complex proba-
bilistic constraints relevant to interpretation of the ambiguous sentences, whereas low-span partici-
pants’ reading times reﬂected the inﬂuence of only simple constraints. Pearlmutter and MacDonald
speculated that the differences in performance stemmed from differences in experience, that the
high-span comprehenders read more and therefore had sufﬁcient exposure to complex combinatorial
information that they could apply on-line during ambiguity resolution. Similarly, Farmer,
Christiansen, and Kemtes (2005) found that when strong statistical biases existed in sentence mate-
rials, high-span individuals appeared to rely primarily on the statistical information, whereas their
low-span counterparts ignored statistical information in favor of other cues, such as discourse context.
An obvious extension of this work would be to examine the effects of experience in comprehenders
with different abilities and/or experiences, such as readers with different amounts of reading experi-
ence or ‘‘print exposure” (Acheson, Wells, & MacDonald, 2008; Stanovich & West, 1989).
The importance of experience in relative clause comprehension, and the link between adult sen-
tence processing and learning processes, are further underscored by work in child language acquisi-
tion, especially studies of relative clause acquisition. Roth (1984) provided children with extra
experience and feedback on processing relative clauses, including subject and object relatives like
those investigated here. A control group received experience processing other structures. The results
showed that children with direct experience in comprehending relative clauses improved their com-
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that the experience with relative clauses lead to improved processing efﬁciency and suggested that
developmental changes in relative clause processing should be traced to linguistic experience, not
growth of working memory. This view is consistent with experience-based continuity across the life
span in which the use of constraints in adult language comprehension emerges as the product of a
developmental process driven by the integration of multiple cues (Bates & MacWhinney, 1987;
Farmer, Christiansen, & Monaghan, 2006; Gennari & MacDonald, 2006; Seidenberg, 1997; Seidenberg
& MacDonald, 1999; Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004).
5.5. Nature and nurture in individual differences
Our approach in this research has been to emphasize the learning side, rather than the capacity
limits, of Miller’s (1956) observations concerning memory performance and its implications for lan-
guage comprehension. We see this approach as a useful addition to the sub-ﬁeld of sentence pro-
cessing that has tended to emphasize capacity limits over the role of learning in relative clauses
(e.g., Gibson, 1998; Just & Carpenter, 1992; King & Just, 1991; Lewis et al., 2006) and to the sub-ﬁeld
that has tended to emphasize rapid use of probabilistic constraints without exploring how the
knowledge came to be learned (MacDonald & Seidenberg, 2006). This focus on learning does not
mean that we do not see innate individual differences as a potential source of behavioral variation.
Indeed, MacDonald and Christiansen (2002) argued against a conception of processing capacity as
separate from learning about the language; they did not argue against innate variation in general.
They discussed some potential sources of innate variation and how self-selection of experiences
(such as how much people choose to read) may vary in complex ways with innate factors. We
see computational modeling that explores parameter spaces of both innate constraints and amount
of learning (e.g., Gupta & Tisdale, submitted for publication) as having an important role in future
research on the complex joint effects of innate constraints and experience in understanding individ-
ual differences in linguistic performance.
Recent data in statistical learning suggest another possible source of innate variation with potential
to have complex interactions with experience—individual differences in statistical learning itself.
Whereas some researchers had previously assumed that there are not substantial individual differ-
ences in statistical learning (e.g., Reber, 1993), recent studies have shown individual differences in
success in statistical learning tasks. For example, individuals with developmental or acquired language
impairments appear less able to learn statistical regularities involving both linguistic and nonlinguis-
tic stimuli (Christiansen, Kelly, Shillcock, & Greenﬁeld, submitted for publication; Evans & Saffran,
2005; Hsu, Christiansen, Tomblin, Zhang, & Gómez, 2006; Plante, Gómez, & Gerken, 2002). It is cur-
rently not clear the extent to which these performance differences reﬂect individual differences in
learning per se, or in perceptual acuity, other cognitive abilities, experiences, or some combinations
of such factors. Nonetheless, these differences offer intriguing possibilities concerning the complex
nature of interactions between innate abilities and linguistic experience in language comprehension
processes. We suspect that the combination of computational modeling and experience manipulations
that we have used will prove useful in this area as well.Acknowledgments
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Appendix A
Reading Times (ms) not adjusted for length and (standard deviations) for Relative Clause and Con-
trol Experience Groups for Subject Relative (SR) and Object Relative (OR) sentences in Pre-test and
Post-test sessions.
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SR, pre-test 383 (107) 381 (121) 425 (152) 376 (89)
OR, pre-test 371 (104) 415 (162) 491 (192) 393 (103)
SR, post-test 301 (69) 292 (72) 330 (103) 304 (60)
OR, post-test 285 (60) 310 (98) 345 (103) 313 (60)Control experience group (N = 32)
SR, pre-test 375 (95) 389 (125) 449 (174) 367 (94)
OR, pre-test 370 (92) 426 (144) 484 (182) 387 (113)
SR, post-test 302 (70) 298 (77) 319 (95) 312 (78)
OR, post-test 293 (66) 307 (91) 370 (124) 330 (81)References
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